Cultural Relativism and Moral Imperialism, the Role of the Female Body in International Relations between the West and South-West Asia

Introduction​​ 

“Women and their presence in the world, of yesterday and today, are considered a revealing test - it is said - of the degree of development, civilization, modernity - or their opposite - of this or that population” (Genesis, 2005, page 5, translation is mine). This sentence by the historian Andreina De Clementi summarizes the theoretical framework within which this article is positioned; in particular, it wishes to fit into the feminist and post-colonial tradition of international relations (Dunne, Kurki, Smith; 2013). This article wishes to represent an answer that is valid as a theoretical model starting from two specific case studies: Türkiye and Iran. It analyzes how the political, economic and military imperialism that these two territories have suffered from Western powers, first European and then American, has triggered an incessant search for liberation from external influences. This research has expressed itself in the need to re-appropriate those values ​​that the West and the processes of Westernization have forcibly obscured and repressed (Pratt, 2020).

As known in the academic context, what Rudyard Kipling called​​ the white man's burden​​ (Kipling, 1899) did not end during the twentieth century, but rather took other forms; sometimes, propaganda rhetoric justified Western imperialism in the name of liberation processes, during which certain abuses of power led to the clash between the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the state and the duty of humanitarian interference (Cassese, 2021). These liberation processes have, at times, concerned women in their specificity (Genesis, 2005; Pratt, 2020)¹.

Starting from the critical constructivist assumption that the political sovereignty of certain states is limited despite meeting the formal requirements of this condition (Cassese, 2021), non-Western states have had to adapt to international standards of​​ modernity​​ and homologation to Western principles in order to maintain their sovereignty. However, according to Professor Nicola Pratt, newly decolonized states (physically, economically or politically) have found a “compromise of sovereignty” in​​ the division of the public sphere from the private one. Having to adapt to Western standards to avoid falling victim of imperialism again, the public sphere has been reformed according to the precepts of liberal modernity, as will be analyzed in the following paragraphs. The private sphere, on the other hand, has become the place where one’s authenticity and fundamental cultural diversity from the West is expressed. It is no coincidence that women’s rights often fall within the private sphere (Pratt, 2020).

A series of historical facts have made the female body become, as stated by Andreina De Clementi, the unit of measurement with which the progress, or authenticity, of a given nation and culture is calculated. The ultimate goal of this article is, in short, to analyze how the female body has been used and continues to be used as a justification for foreign policy actions, both by Western states and those of Southwest Asia, through a propaganda and thought apparatus that develops between cultural relativism and moral imperialism. Finally, through the analysis of Western press on women's rights in Iran and the analysis of President Erdoğan's speeches, the thesis attempts to demonstrate how the current international order is based on gender oppression; and how, if this were to be missing, it would also bring along the structure that maintains the status quo.

The difficult evolution of the relation between Türkiye and the West​​ 

The difficult relations between Southwest Asia and the West and their evolution over time had evident discontinuities but within a constant asymmetric power relationship. The most important teaching for the purposes of this article is the understanding of the reciprocity of the relationship between the two entities, which is inscribed in a bond of evident subordination, within which, however, each subject has a broad capacity for agency, which goes beyond the dynamics of simple cause-effect relations. The following paragraph describes the most important historical events that have affected the Ottoman Empire first and Türkiye then in the last two centuries in the relations with Western influence and domination. The text attempts to condense into a few pages a series of long- and short-term phenomena that have contributed significantly to the current perpetually unstable balance that sees Türkiye on one side and the United States and the European Union on the other, and that pervades not only the foreign or economic policy choices of the two factions, but also their very cultural identity and self-perception. This article believes that a preliminary analysis of these phenomena is necessary to understand the motivations behind the instrumentalization of the female body. This paragraph is entirely based on secondary sources; in particular, unless otherwise specified, the text uses the following manual as a source: Bunton, M., Cleveland, W. (2016)​​ A History of the Modern Middle East, Boulder: Westview Press.

During the eighteenth century, the overwhelming influence of European trade and capital led to the integration of the economies of Southwest Asia into the global economic system. The agricultural and commercial production of the region depended on the demand of the European market and was therefore subject to price fluctuations according to the needs of Europe. Southwest Asia thus became a region dependent on the economic system of the West, exporting raw materials to it and importing manufactured goods from it. Institutional changes in the region occurred simultaneously with economic changes: while the rulers of the Ottoman Empire and Iran sought to reform their military and administrative institutions, these countries were caught up in the changes in the world economy that Europe was shaping according to its pleasures and needs.​​ 

It is during this period that Western-style reforms begin in the Ottoman Empire, especially regarding military training and the bureaucratic apparatus, limiting the antique power of the clergy. During the era of the​​ Tanzimat​​ (1839-1876), the process of Westernization proceeded to involve the sphere of civilian education: the first step had been taken to remove from the ulama​​ the control of an area, the educational one, which had not previously been considered a prerogative of the state. The reformism of the​​ Tanzimat​​ extended to the juridical-legal world: a new Penal, Commercial and Civil Code (the​​ Mejelle, 1876) were promulgated, inspired by the French Civil Code. Through exchanges with Europe, several exponents of the imperial elite became convinced of the fact that Western success did not derive simply from technical-military superiority but also from the political institutions that characterized the administrative structure of European states.​​ 

These are the premises that lead to the birth of the Turkish Republic right after the First World War, and the process of Westernization and de-Islamization carried out by the first President and founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The policies of Atatürk’s government were part of the process of secularization and Europeanization that had its roots in the advent of the nineteenth century. Mustafa Kemal’s secular reformism, however, was much less extended in time and was, for this reason, a much more evident break with the Islamic past of the Ottoman tradition. In 1924, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the office of Caliph and that of Sheikh al-Islam were abolished, all members of the royal family were exiled and all religious schools were closed. Two years later, Atatürk decided to renew the legal system, abolishing the​​ Mejelle​​ and the application of the Shari’ah and adopting the Swiss Civil Code instead, as well as modifying the criminal and commercial codes using other Western models. The ulama class was severely penalized by these decisions: by now the entire political sphere was secularized, including family law. In 1926, in fact, polygamy was legally prohibited and new rules were established that allowed women to request divorce more easily.​​ 

There was a real restriction of the population's rights to Islamic religious practice: the possibility of wearing the​​ fez​​ headdress was prohibited, to which Atatürk opposed the Panama-style hat, considering it the "headdress of civilized nations" (Cleveland, 2016); worship at shrines and tombs was prohibited and all Sufi Islamic brotherhoods were dissolved. Some even more controversial reforms include the replacement of Friday, as a day of rest, with Sunday; a similar reasoning underlies the replacement of the Hijri calendar with the Gregorian. Atatürk took a move that risked being blasphemous and in 1932 had the Quran translated and read publicly in Turkish. Translations of the Quran had, until then, been forbidden by the regime, since, according to Islam, the Quran was revealed to Muhammad in Arabic, and it is therefore considered the language chosen by God. From 1932, Kemal wanted all​​ ezan​​ to be held in Turkish. A particularly important aim of Kemalist reformism was to create an attachment to the Turkish state and national identity rather than to Islam. One way to create a sense of Turkish identity that Atatürk achieved was the reform of the language. This involved profound changes: from 1929 it was made mandatory to use the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic one. This move made it much more difficult for the new Turkish generations to have access to Ottoman documentation in the original alphabet; a break that Kemal wanted to make. Kemal’s pro-European reformism expanded to include the status of women; women were encouraged to assimilate Western customs and habits. More significant were the reforms in female education, which led to the inclusion of women in public life.

In the 1950s, Türkiye’s integration into the Western bloc saw further significant developments: 1952 marked the country’s entry into NATO, while in 1955 the Turkish Republic signed the Baghdad Pact with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the United Kingdom under the aegis of the United States. However, not all segments of the population appreciated such a strong Western influence in the country. A period of strong political instability began, and was destined to last for decades. It saw strong clashes between the Kemalists and those sections of the population that had been disadvantaged by Atatürk's policies and wanted to reclaim their religious and cultural origins. It is within these dynamics that the coups d'états that occurred in 1960, 1971 and 1980 took place.​​ 

The year 1999 was a moment of culmination for all those Europeanization policies that the Turkish and Ottoman governments had been pursuing for two centuries; during the European Council in Helsinki, in fact, the Republic of Türkiye was officially included among the candidate states for membership in the European Union. The long-awaited candidacy, however, did not arrive without controversy. The declaration was not accompanied by a start date for accession negotiations; the latter, in the case of Türkiye, was subject to the acquisition of all the requirements set by the EU. It is important for the purposes of the analysis presented here to highlight that this decision was taken solely in relation to Türkiye; the classic procedure for acquiring the requirements envisaged that these could be achieved during the negotiations. In the Turkish case, however, the acquisition was preparatory to, and not contemporaneous with, the latter. Among the Copenhagen criteria, which establish the requirements for accession to the Union, some were and continue to be particularly complex to address from the Turkish point of view (Alessandrini, Lesser, Tastan, 2018):

• Belonging to the European Identity

A true “European identity” has never really been defined, despite being a mixture of historical, geographical and cultural elements. The fact that Türkiye can become part of the countries that bear this identity is a source of great conflict both in academic debate and in Turkish public opinion. This debate did not, however, arise with the candidacy for membership, but is rather a long-term issue, reminiscent of the Ottoman Empire being part of the main European actors but without receiving an invitation to the Congress of Vienna (Cammarano, Guazzaloca, Piretti, 2015). Quite similarly, Türkiye is part of the major Western institutions, but not of the EU. One factor that the literature on the subject highlights is related to religion; there is no official document that links the European identity to Christianity, however all the EU states are Christian majority, and it is undeniable that in the West there is a prejudice that links Islam to a negative connotation, especially following September 11th, 2001 and the “War on Terror”.

• ​​ Democratization

Examining the problems that the implementation of democratic principles encounters in Türkiye is very complicated and is deferred to future studies. Generally speaking, it can be said here that there are clear shortcomings: in the protection of the Kurdish minority, victim of strong discrimination since the birth of the Republic in 1923; in the correct functioning of the judiciary, abused by the government in an attempt to silence political opponents; in freedom of expression, which is deeply limited, especially following the 2016 coup d'état, and which is censored when attacks are made on the AKP or the memory of Mustafa Kemal; in the protection of the LGBTQIA+ community, which is deeply discriminated against in various areas, especially following the polarization of the population in the 2010s; in the treatment reserved to the foreign refugee population, often victim of racism not only by the general population but also institutionalized by the Republican People's Party (CHP).​​ 

• ​​ Economic criteria

Again, the purposes of this article do not allow for an in-depth analysis of the current economic crisis in Türkiye, for which I refer to future studies. However, it can be said that the political changes of the last twenty years have led to a long-term inflation process that, at the time of writing, does not seem to stop, accompanied by a constant devaluation of the Turkish lira.

• Other criteria

In the category “other criteria” we can certainly remember the Cyprus question and, recently, the Syrian question. The outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011 has led to constant migratory flows out of Syria and into neighboring Türkiye. If Türkiye was part of the EU, the Syrian refugee population would have freedom of movement within the Union and freedom to request asylum in other member states, an eventuality that, in light of recent migration policies, is clear that the EU does not like. Türkiye is thus maintained as a “buffer state” between the European Union, which acts as a fortress, and Southwest Asia, full of populations fleeing precarious living conditions.

During the first decade of the 2000s, negotiations between the European Union and Türkiye have remained mainly at a standstill. The 2010s have been characterized by the resurgence of populism in Western Europe, accompanied by an increase in racist and Islamophobic sentiments, as well as a growing resentment of the population towards European institutions. In Türkiye, the strengthening of President Erdoğan's power has led to a lowering of the country's democracy index. The feelings of frustration of the Turkish population towards European institutions are also growing. In short, at the time of writing, negotiations between the EU and Turkey appear to be volatile and with an uncertain future, almost certainly a failure.

Considering what has been summarized, it is observable that European and American influence has been extremely relevant in the events and phenomena that have affected Türkiye in the last two centuries. It is equally observable how the country has been, since the nineteenth century, characterized by a double and contradictory soul, which sees the maintenance of traditional cultural and religious stratum and a perennial desire to culturally assimilate to Europe, which however is not satisfied. In the following chapters, the fundamental role of the female body as a regulator (or as a destabilizing element) of the relations between the Turkish Republic and the West is inserted into this analysis.

Western colonialism and the Iranian response from the Qajar dynasty to today

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a political structure that is completely unique in the world, which makes it a truly unparalleled case study. What led to the birth of this peculiarity was a combination of long- and short-term historical phenomena and cultural peculiarities specific to the Persian region. Certainly, among the historical elements that contributed to the birth of the Islamic Republic, we can include Western imperialism, the cause of strong economic and social hardships throughout the twentieth century. Of particular importance is also Shiite Islam, characterized by a strong connotation of rebellion since the time of the Crescent Schism (Campanini, Torelli, 2017). Another relevant component lies in the Westernist and despotic policies carried out by the Pahlavi dynasty and its alliance with the United States. The following paragraphs attempt to summarize the events that affected the Iranian territory during the last century and that led to the current moment of fundamental international isolationism of the Islamic Republic. The purpose of this chapter is to be helpful in clarifying the context in which the instrumentalization of the female body for geopolitical purposes takes place in the specific case of relations between Iran and the West. This paragraph is entirely based on secondary sources; in particular, unless otherwise specified, the text uses the following manual as a source: Bunton, M., Cleveland, W. (2016) A History of the Modern Middle East, Boulder: Westview Press.

Although Western influences were expressed in a very different way than in the Ottoman Empire, they were also very important in Iran and deserve an equally in-depth analysis. The Western powers that were most strategically interested in the Persian area during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire. The commercial outcome was similar to that experienced by the Ottoman Empire: Iran was soon included in global trade flows and became what Immanuel Wallerstein calls a peripheral state, that is, supplying raw materials to European states (considered central states) and receiving refined products from them (Wallerstein, 1982). It was Nasir al-Din Shah who found himself in the middle of this dispute: in an attempt to gain funding from both sides, he tended to make economic concessions, one of which consisted of the construction of a state telegraph line, operated by a British company. The continuous succession of concessions to the United Kingdom and the Russian Empire meant that Iran was continually assailed by European financiers, such as the entrepreneur Julius de Reuter, who in 1872 became historically known for the largest concession ever negotiated. Reuter was granted the exclusive right to build any canal, dam or railway line in Iran, while at the same time having strong privileges in the agricultural-mining sector.​​ 

The result of the two countries’ ongoing dispute over Iran’s industrial development was to maintain a situation of economic backwardness. In 1890, the Shah granted a British company a monopoly on the entire production, sale and export of Iranian tobacco; this led to a popular response, which manifested itself in a series of revolts led by the ulama, who declared the Shah’s conduct to be contrary to Islamic principles. This was followed by the reign of Muzzafir al-Din Shah (1896-1906), who continued the policy of concessions begun by his predecessor. In particular, in 1901 he granted a British private citizen, William D'Arcy, a monopoly on oil in all of Iran except for five provinces, from which Iran would receive 16% of the annual revenues. While the United Kingdom used Iranian oil to carry on its industry, Iran continued to ask for loans from foreign institutions, which were mostly used to pay off debts contracted previously, but also to finance the Shah's personal expenses. The strong economic privileges held by the Europeans in Iran thanks to the concessions were very destabilizing for the local economy, whose merchant class began to suffer deep losses.

Russia and the United Kingdom did not miss the opportunity to exploit the political turbulence that was animating the Iranian territory at the beginning of the twentieth century between the factions in favor of a constitutional government and those in favor of monarchical absolutism, militarily occupying Iran. The country, indeed, entered the 1910s accompanied by an extremely precarious political and economic situation, in full foreign military occupation. As can easily be imagined, at the end of the First World War Iran found itself in a further damaged economic and political condition. The effective power of the country remained in the hands of the occupying powers and, with the advent of the Russian Revolution of 1917, specifically in the hands of the United Kingdom, with an increase in the resentment of the population towards foreign occupation. The United Kingdom, worried about the new threat from the Bolshevik Revolution, increased its control of the country, unleashing a series of anti-colonial protests throughout the territory. In this context, the prominent figure of Colonel Reza Khan came into play.

In 1923, when the Turkish Republic was born, Reza Khan became Prime Minister of Iran, sending the Shah into exile; in 1925, the Qajar dynasty was deposed in favor of the new Pahlavi dynasty, with Reza Khan Shah. In addition to the historical moment, the two reformers Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah also had other things in common; Reza Shah resumed several Kemalist policies with the aim of reforming the Kingdom towards Westernization. However, the differences between Atatürk and Reza Shah were much deeper than the similarities. Unlike Kemal, Reza Shah did not really intend to destroy the pre-existing order: political elections were held regularly, but the fraud perpetrated by the Shah made them powerless; he ignored the Constitution when it was unfavorable to him, carried out a strong policy of censorship and did not hesitate to arrest his opponents. He had, in fact, complete control of the state apparatus. For Reza Shah, as for Atatürk, secularism was a significant element. The sphere on which secularization policies hit hardest was the legislative one starting from 1928, the year in which the​​ Majlis​​ voted to approve a new Civil Code inspired by the French one. Although the legislation stipulated that no legal act could contravene the Shari'a, this element was ignored by the government of Reza Shah. A new hierarchy of the judiciary was established, in which the role of the ulama was confined mainly to matters concerning the private sphere and family laws; at the top of the hierarchy were now the secular state courts. The attacks on the ulama class intensified more and more, with the confiscation of​​ waqfs, the requirement to attend at least three years of law studies to be able to practice as a judge, and the ulama being prohibited from registering legal documents. The process of secularization did not stop with the reduction of the power of the clergy, but spread to the whole society; like Mustafa Kemal, Reza Shah also intervened on the clothing of Iranian men and women. It was made obligatory for men to dress according to Western standards and to wear a hat. In 1936, women were prohibited to wear the hijab, as was gender segregation; however, the policies of apparent female “emancipation” carried out by Reza Shah did not really intend to offer greater rights to women, as they continued to be excluded from the right to vote, and it remained much more difficult for them, compared to men, to initiate divorce proceedings.

At the outbreak of the Second World War, Iran declared its neutrality, which was however largely trampled upon by the Allied forces when German troops invaded the Soviet Union in 1941; the United Kingdom and the USSR responded by occupying Iranian territory to continue to maintain control over the area. The Iranian situation during the Second World War was very similar to that experienced during the Great War: the state was completely in the hands of foreign powers. The occupation of Iranian territory by the Allies represented a serious disrespect for the national sovereignty of the state. The productive processes of Iran were diverted according to the war needs of the Anglo-Russian coalition, without considering the consequences that this could have had for the national economy. The massive presence of foreigners in the territory, moreover, led to a strong inflationary process that affected a large part of the population. The Trans-Iranian railway, which once represented the greatest symbol of independence of the nation, was now used by the Soviet Union, and oil production was now the prerogative of the Allies. Once entered the war, the United States joined the occupation of Iran and, in addition to sending its own troops, began a process that would bring them into Iranian politics for a long time, through the appointment of numerous American consultants in the most important areas for state management, including the financial and military. With the onset of the Cold War, the first states in Southwest Asia to be drawn into the competition between the two spheres of influence were Türkiye and Iran; given their proximity to the Soviet Union, they were particularly important in the eyes of the United States. The massive presence of the United States in Southwest Asia became a strong source of resentment among the population, not only in Iran but in the entire region.

Reza Shah was succeeded in 1941 by his son, Muhammad Reza Shah (1919-1980). Although Iran was not a Western colony in the strict sense of the term, for the entire first half of the twentieth century it found itself at the mercy of colonial powers, whose actions had a significant impact on the life of the Iranian population: all factions of the country's social spectrum, in fact, found a common ground in the need to limit foreign power over the state. The voice of the population was embodied by the figure of Muhammad Mossadeq (1882-1967). After serving a period of imprisonment for opposing the government of Reza Shah, he was elected deputy in 1943, becoming the person who intended to protect the country most fervently from foreign influence. In 1949 the National Front was born, a party with a diversified soul led by Mossadeq, who focused on limiting monarchical power and foreign interference. At the heart of the National Front’s interests was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), whose revenues were primarily for the British, and which had evolved exponentially over time to gain its own identity, separate from the country: AIOC built its own city in Abadan, with its own airports, its own services, its own security policies, and so on. Iranians represented the working class of the Company, while the upper echelons of industry were reserved for the British. Mossadeq, on the other hand, called for the nationalization of Iranian oil.

The year 1951 marked a radical change in the course of events: the​​ Majlis, in fact, listened to the voice of the people, nationalizing oil and appointing Muhammad Mossadeq as Prime Minister. The nationalization led to an immediate response from the AIOC, which inaugurated a phase of boycott of Iranian oil, also joined by the United States, and which was accompanied by a series of economic sanctions on Iran and a naval blockade by the United Kingdom. Despite the serious economic losses, the Mossadeq government did not intend to give in to compromises; a choice that led to the worsening of Iranian diplomatic relations with the West, while at the same time taking more and more power out of the hands of the Shah. This led to the infamous​​ Operation Ajax​​ of 1953, which united nostalgic Iranian military forces with US and British intelligence agencies, in which the CIA played a key role, and resulted in a coup that deposed Mossadeq. His deposition led to a fundamental return to everything Mossadeq stood against: royal autocracy and Western influence in the country. Members of the National Front, including Mossadeq, were imprisoned; many were tortured and executed. The Shah increased diplomatic relations with Western powers, adopting their state model and protection: this led to the return of Iranian oil to the international market in 1954, with revenues shared 50/50 with Iran, and to constant flows of economic assistance from the United States.​​ 

The Shah's power became increasingly autocratic, to the point of developing a surveillance organization, SAVAK, which was full of American and Israeli consultants, and which became known for the brutality to which it subjected political opponents. It was precisely this that created a climate of despair and protest, in which the figure of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged, who began a work of preaching that went strongly against American influence on the state, and which pointed to the Shah as the figure who was neglecting the needs of the people and who was going against good religious norms. Despite the regime’s pressure and the growing danger of openly expressing dissent, the ulama continued to resist, denouncing autocracy, corruption, and the imitation of Western models of development and consumption, which they considered contrary to Islamic values. Thanks to their close ties with the population, the ulama were able to communicate their dissent despite the regime’s repression. The Shah’s response to the opposition became even more ruthless from 1975 onwards, including detention, systematic torture, and censorship.

It is with these premises, at least eighty years old, that the Iranian Revolution takes place. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 had a profound impact not only on Iran, but also on the entire Southwest Asia, Muslim-majority states around the world, and external powers with interests in the region. Within Iran, the Revolution was a cataclysmic event, radically transforming the country's political, social, economic, and legal structures. The Revolution led to the overthrow of the Shah, the abolition of the monarchy, and the establishment of an Islamic Republic, with the subsequent replacement of secular laws with Islamic law codes. This process also led to the removal of political and military elites associated with the old regime and the emergence of a new ruling class. The success of the Revolution inspired Muslims globally, especially those who were disillusioned with Western models of development and longed for a return to Islamic institutions as a basis for building a better future. However, governments in Southwest Asia, including conservative monarchs and secular presidents, perceived the emergence of a militant Islamic Republic in Iran as a threat to regional stability, thus isolating Iran diplomatically. The Revolution also had significant consequences for U.S. foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region. The regime, conditioned by the heavy attacks it received, soon transformed into a new authoritarianism, different from that of the Shah but still oppressive, imposing a rigid ideological conformism on the whole society.

Further authoritarianism occurred in the area of ​​gender relations, leading to a regression of women's rights gained during the reigns of the two Pahlavi Shahs. In 1980, a dress code was introduced requiring all women, including those employed in the public sector, to wear loose-fitting clothing and the hijab. Many women who had worn the hijab during the 1978 protests as a symbol of cultural identity and revolutionary solidarity did not anticipate that this would become a legal requirement, facing arrest up to a year in prison. In 1981, the Family Protection Laws, introduced by Muhammad Reza Shah, were radically changed: women lost significant rights, including the right to seek divorce, maintain custody of children, attend school if married, and study disciplines such as law, medicine, and engineering. Khomeini and his supporters justified these restrictions by arguing that women's emancipation would destabilize the family, assigning women the primary role of mother and wife, which was considered incompatible with participation in public life. However, despite these limitations, women retained the right to vote, which they used more and more actively in the following years.

It is possible to affirm that the Iranian Revolution was an event of absolutely exceptional significance, as it managed to be a truly mass phenomenon, in which millions of people participated and which managed to unite many different souls under the banner of the reacquisition of political sovereignty over their own territory. Certainly, a series of factors internal and external to the newborn Republic undermined some of its fundamental premises, and among these is the role of Iranian women. Particular attention is paid, in the following chapters, to the use of the hijab, the same garment that symbolized, during the protests against the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, a means of reappropriating one's identity as Muslim women, Iranian, and independent from the will of a sovereign; the same garment that, in 2022, caused the assassination of Mahsa Amini by the Iranian police, testimony to the fact that it is on women's bodies that the history of the world has been written, and continues to be written.

The “conservation” of the female body and role as an expression of moral superiority: An analysis of President​​ Erdoğan’s speeches

This paragraph aims to complete a critical analysis of the Turkish discourse on the female body and role. The methodology used is largely inspired by the work of the academic Norman Fairclough in the field of sociolinguistics, and partially also by Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas, Antonio Gramsci, Edward Said and Valentin-Yves Mudimbe. This analysis attempts to fit into the post-structuralist critical tradition, which, expanding from the theory of social constructivism, highlights the importance of representations, the construction of identities and power relations in social dynamics (Campbell, 2013). In particular, this chapter attempts to underline the importance of the relationship between the use of language, ideological construction and the exercise of power, and safeguards the centrality of critical discourse analysis for social research. According to Professor Christopher N. Candlin, critical discourse analysis is an analytical framework, composed of theory and method, for the study of language in relation to power, and is emphasized as a useful resource dedicated to subaltern subjects for the fight against oppression in its linguistic declinations. In general, the critical approach believes that the ability to control discourse is necessary for the maintenance of ideological predominance over alternative practices.

Fairclough’s hypothesis, taken as certain here, is that, in contemporary societies, discourse has assumed a central role in sociocultural change. Critical discourse analysis is defined as a three-dimensional framework: it analyses texts, discursive practices, and discursive events seen as sociocultural practices. Scholars Wodak, van Dijk, Thibault, Kress, van Leeuwen and Fairclough himself identify in the technologization of discourse a calculated intervention aimed at changing discursive practices as an integral part of the engineering of social change (Fairclough, 1995). In order for the analysis carried out here to be as complete as possible, it was decided to also examine forms of documents that are not necessarily linguistic; specifically, multimedia productions such as photographic images and videos are also analyzed. The choice derives from my appropriation of the definition of document according to archival science, which states that the term indicates any object that can constitute certification of a fact or a specific environment, regardless of its nature, its form and its support (Guercio, 2019). The choice is also partially due to the constant increase in multi-semiotic texts, in which the primary semiotic form of language is combined with other forms, resulting in the development of a “social semiotics” (Fairclough, 1995). Furthermore, this reasoning is in line with what has been stated so far with regard to the critical analysis of discourse: the structure of which a text is composed is an integral part of its content, and so is the body language of the subjects involved, which can be deduced in some multimedia productions reported here. Unfortunately, this chapter's approach also has significant methodological limitations, the first of which is the transcription of speeches by prominent Turkish figures in English rather than in their original language (Turkish).​​ 

It is particularly relevant for the purposes of this analysis and, in my opinion, for any other critical analysis of discourse, to introduce the concept of opacity. Ideology and ideological practices can become, more or less evidently, “naturalized”, and can therefore be considered as an integral part of the nature of things and people, rather than as an expression of the interests of certain groups (Fairclough, 1983). Naturalized ideologies and practices are therefore integrated into the “knowledge base” that is activated during social interaction. According to Fairclough, it is in this way that a general consensus is reached towards such ideological practices and positions, which modify the social structure and are modified by them. Opacity lies in being unaware, as participants, of the effects of such practices on society, and therefore of the ideological position that each subject holds. The purpose of critical analysis turns out to be precisely that of denaturalizing.​​ 

The so-called “autonomous subject effect” is a particular manifestation of the general tendency towards opacity that is inherent in ideology: ideology produces subjects who do not appear “subjugated” or produced, but “free, homogeneous and responsible for their own actions” (Coward, Ellis, 1977, p. 77). The autonomous subject effect is at the heart of theories of the individual, which, according to Fairclough, sometimes tend to exaggerate the extent to which actions are under the conscious control of subjects (Fairclough, 1983). Critical theories tend to agree on the centrality of the creation of consensus in the exercise of power, rather than on the use of physical force (despite the eternal presence of the latter). It is through discourse that consensus is reached, ideologies are transmitted, and practices, meanings, values ​​and identities are taught and learned (Fairclough, 1992). The concept of opacity is therefore particularly relevant in the analysis of discourse in relation to asymmetric power relations; the aim of this article is precisely to make visible that ideology, still too opaque, present in the relations between genders and in the relations between the West and Asia, and the very important intersection and co-dependence between the two. "As history constantly teaches us, discourse is not simply what translates struggles or systems of domination, but rather it is the thing through which the struggle exists; discourse is the power that must be defeated" (Focault, 1984, p. 110).

A prominent figure in these paragraphs is certainly the President of the Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; some of his statements on the role of women and the situation of women in Türkiye are examined, as well as some speeches he gave that do not specifically refer to gender, but from which it is possible to extrapolate relevant information. Photographs and videos of President Erdoğan are also not exempt from analysis, in which the particularly “masculine” and authoritarian characteristics of his figure are analyzed. In contrast to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the figure of his wife, First Lady Emine Erdoğan, is analyzed, as well as some of her speeches and images in public appearances; by combining the analysis of these two figures, it is possible to extrapolate the model of the traditional nuclear family that the presidential couple symbolizes. Speeches, images and videos are also analyzed, in which President Erdoğan assumes the role of political and partially spiritual leader of Türkiye and the entire Islamic world, in a Neo-Ottomanist perspective, against Western oppression; particular importance is given to the apparent discrepancy between the fight supported by Erdoğan in favor of the rights of a minority, that of the Muslim community, and the contemporary subjugation of another minority, women and queer subjectivities, whose very close relationship is analyzed.​​ 

The following analysis is formed on a speech given by President Erdoğan at the Women's Labor Summit, on December 19th, 2022:​​ 

It is possible to begin a critical analysis right from the beginning of the speech: “Anyone with an idea who are producers and who is working in order to ensure others live, we will stand with them, that’s how we initiated this program called the women’s labor”. Although it is not immediately observable, it is easy to extrapolate from the context the subject to whom President Erdoğan refers when he speaks of “producers, and who work in order to ensure the lives of others”: women. In this opening sentence, it is therefore already possible to highlight an analytical fact: President Edogan considers the role that women play in society important in terms of the support they offer to others. Continuing to analyze the same period, one can note the creation of an otherness in the sentence “we will be with them”, in which the opposition between “we” and “them” indicates a separation of the genders; it is possible to extrapolate from this data that the subject speaks on behalf of a fraction of society, from the perspective of the male “we”, which excludes a female “them”. From the last part of the period, “we have started this program called women’s labor”, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan therefore lets a paternalistic approach to the female gender, for which the male “we” has created a support program.​​ 

Continuing with the speech, President Erdoğan states: “throughout those meetings we have heard such stories that once again we have witnessed the determination, the commitment and the endeavors of our women, and it is almost impossible not to fall in love with their determination, commitment and their efforts. Within the last twenty years, we have realized many reforms, to all of which all women have contributed remarkably”. Here too, the same creation of an otherness between “us” and “our women” is present, of which the possessive adjective “our” is particularly relevant, which is repeated regularly within the speech and which expresses, as a possessive adjective, the possession of Turkish women (“our women”) by Turkish men (“us”). It is also possible to detect in this portion of the text the paternalistic approach of the speaker who, by stating that “we have carried out many reforms, to all of which all women have contributed significantly”, underlines the creation of such reforms by men (“we”), and the supporting role played instead by women, described as “collaborators”, who do not appear to be the active subjects responsible for the changes brought about. Continuing to analyze the speech, one can deduce the continuous presence of the possessive adjective “our”, as in “of our six ladies”, or “the masterpiece of our women”; this last expression in particular (“the masterpiece of our women”) also fits into the paternalistic approach of President Erdoğan, in which the word “masterpiece” enters the semantic field of the work of art, alluding to something beautiful and immobile.

With “that’s why we are determined to extend greater support to our women. The programs such as entrepreneurial support and the agricultural grants are used and benefited by our women with which we are really pleased”, the speaking subject continues to develop the otherness between “us” and “them”, underlining once again that his is an exclusively male perspective, despite the fact that “us” is used as a pronoun replacing “Turkish society” in its entirety. From here we can easily analyze an implicit characteristic that is fundamental to the analysis: Turkish society, for President Erdoğan, is identified with Turkish men, and women represent a figure of support for this society. It is possible to find this vision also in the period “as it has been seen we are showing positive discrimination towards our ladies, towards our women and we are attaching significant importance to our women so they can realize their dreams, their targets”, within which a benevolent male “us” appears again and leads “our women” to the realization of their dreams. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan states that “we have taken a new step to provide two hundred billion Turkish Liras to provide additional support to our real sector. […] of course we didn’t forget our ladies, our women, and two billion Turkish Liras of bailout package had been allocated to our women entrepreneurs”. In doing so, he illustrates to the listeners that he has allocated two hundred billion Turkish Liras to support the real economy, of which two billion are destined for (once again referred to as “our”) women entrepreneurs. It almost automatically follows that the remaining 198 billion are allocated to non-female entrepreneurship, and therefore, according to President Erdoğan’s binary vision, to male entrepreneurship.

Following this opening of the speech dominated by a strong paternalistic approach, the speaking subject introduces his own conservative and traditionalist vision of the female figure: “we are proud with the success stories of our women who embrace their families and we have no doubt whatsoever that our women will continue to contribute to the economic development of our country. They are the ones who are trying to turn our women into material objects by isolating them from their fundamental futures”. In addition to the persistent presence of the adjective “our” and the paternalistic vision, the sentence “we are proud of the success stories of our women who embrace their families” inevitably links the figure of the woman to the family context and the role she occupies within it. President Erdoğan then uses this as a springboard for the beginning of what appears to be an invective against the opposition: “they are the ones who are trying to turn our women into material objects by isolating them from their fundamental future”. The fundamental future to which the subject refers is motherhood and family life, which he believes to be the essential and indispensable role of women.

This is followed by the beginning of an attempt to exalt the “progressivism” of President Erdoğan and the AKP in terms of women’s rights: “there is no other political party who has such a strong women’s branch as the Justice and Development Party”. What seems to be a source of pride for the speaker, namely the large extension of the women’s branch of the party, is in reality a symptom of gender segregation within the AKP, in which there is a female branch but not a male branch, as the party itself is taken for granted as masculine. The presence of women within the female branch of the AKP but not at the organizational top of the party may be part of the paternalistic approach of President Erdoğan, for whom women are collaborators but not active social actors. Another failed attempt to glorify "progressivism", of which the speaking subject becomes the symbol, can be seen from the following portion of speech: "they are not concerned with the issue of women but we have this concern because we know that a political movement without the participation of women is doomed to fail. Likewise, any political movement without the participation of our youth branches will definitely fail. […] We are getting closer to the end of 2022 and during this year we have carried out many programs for our youth and for our women”. President Erdoğan is concerned that a political movement without women’s participation is doomed to fail, without incorporating the “women’s branch” of the party into prestigious organizational positions. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of “our youth” and “our women”, for whom the male “we” has created many empowerment programs, harks back to the traditional family dynamic in which there is an authoritarian father figure who works to provide for his wife and children.​​ 

Subsequently, one can note that the invective against the opposition continues, and slowly becomes the main theme of the speech in question: “in the past, under the disguise of modernism and being contemporary, there were the ones who tried to separate women from their beliefs, from their dressing codes, and they have tried to marginalize our women due to their belief and to their clothes, and we have witnessed their rude attitudes. Even the teardrops of our women who have been sacked by the public institutions did not ease the hearts of the single party fascism”. In this portion of the speech, the speaker recalls the historical roots of the CHP²​​ and refers to the Islamophobic ban on women, which has long been in place in Türkiye by the will of the latter, from wearing the hijab in public places. To this, President Erdoğan links the proposal for a constitutional amendment made by the opposition at the same time as the speech takes place: “the proposal of a Constitutional amendment regarding the issue of the hijab reminded all of us of those scandalist days. Due to this discussion we once again realize that there are still the ones who are longing for those dark days, and since that was the case, despite our belief that the fundamental rights cannot be the subject of such regulation, we call upon them to propose a Constitutional amendment which will guarantee this right”. The proposal to which the text refers, and which is described as an attempt by the CHP to re-control the female body and “westernize” it, turns out to be, in reality, a proposal to legalize the right of women to use the hijab (and other ornaments not necessarily linked to religion) along with the right not to use them at all, in the context of public places³. It therefore appears to be a proposal that expresses itself in favor of women's free choice of their own clothing, but which is here interpreted as a coercive force in favor of "obligatory disclosure". To this proposed amendment, President Erdoğan and the AKP responded with a mirror proposal to legislate the right of women to wear the hijab and other religious ornaments in public places, which, however, was not excluded from the opposition proposal. Furthermore, the AKP linked this proposed amendment to the discourse on the protection of the family, of marital unions between men and women⁴. Taking up the theoretical approach of Norman Fairclough, in this portion of the text it is evident how the microscopic and the macroscopic levels come together to reinforce a precise power structure, in which the female body is a propaganda tool used to achieve one’s own political ends.

This is particularly evident in the following portion of the text: “in Qandil mountain, the daughters at the age of 10, 11, 12, 13, even 14, had been kidnapped by whom? Aren’t they the members of political parties with whom you are collaborating and cooperating? Aren’t they the extension of the PKK in our Parliament? Mr. Kemal, do you have anything to say against those claims? I wonder if you have spoken against them”. Here President Erdoğan links, through the noun “daughters”, to a topic that seems to have little to do with gender rights, that of the fight against the Kurdish minority, accusing his main opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, of supporting “Kurdish terrorism”. The speech continues by introducing the sensitive topic of the phenomenon of child brides: “we will realize who is advocating for the rights of women and who is trying to abuse the problems of women. […] During this process, a new topic of abuse has been articulated. Indeed, an issue that has been followed for quite some time has been brought to our agenda all of a sudden. We have never appreciated our daughters without reaching to our physical and spiritual maturity, to get married in our own family lives thanks to God we don't have such kind of an example. That's how we acted. Abusing children sexually is not an ethical attitude which can be accepted according to our religion. According to this incident which was brought to our agenda, all our institutions follow this process and they have followed it quite sensitively. Indeed such problems of child marriages have been the problems of our country dating long back. However, apart from the extraordinary examples, this problem has indeed been addressed​​ once and for all”. The phrase "we have never appreciated our daughters without reaching spiritual and physical maturity, [...] the sexual abuse of children is not an ethical attitude that can be accepted according to our religion" is particularly significant. Even in this case, the speaking subject does not abandon the exquisitely male and patriarchal perspective already described previously and which is evident from the "we have never appreciated our daughters", where the verb "to appreciate" refers to the sexual desire of the male "we". Furthermore, it is important to note that sexual abuse of minors is labeled as wrong according to religion, without however referring to the problems that victims of abuse face, making them secondary to the importance of religious precepts.

After clarifying that a solution has been found "once and for all" to the problem of child brides, President Erdoğan introduces what, according to him, is a real problem of the present that urgently needs to be addressed:​​ however we started to face different problems with our society, starting from social media, all those internet platforms, indeed showed us that our children are losing their ways in terms of their relationships with others. And this problem is not limited to our metropolitan cities like Istanbul, this problem is disseminated all around our country. The Republic of Türkiye tuckled the problem of child marriages but right now the Republic of Türkiye is facing another threat: falling upon our children. […] The real problems that our society should tackle first and foremost is the deviance and aberrant movement which is threatening our sons and daughters. I wonder if you understand what I'm saying, let me speak clearly: the issue of LGBT is something that we cannot accept and tolerate. However, I wonder whether the CHP, the Republican People’s Party can accept it, and yes they can, and the other opposition parties can accept that, yes, they walk with them. We don’t need such a divine move. Hopefully, during the next term, together with all our NGOs, our Ministries, we will be much more alert to such kind of a great threat. Even in this portion of the speech, the speaking subject presents himself as an authoritarian father, who must protect his offspring from an “aberrant movement” that “is threatening our sons and daughters,” the “LGBT problem”, which must be urgently fought or would otherwise represent a “failure for our children”. In contrast to this strong stance against the “LGBT problem”, President Erdoğan instead opposes the opposition party, whose members seem not only to “accept” the “LBGT problem”, but also to “walk” alongside its members.​​ 

Shortly after, the speech links the topic of the “LGBT problem” to that of the family: “without a strong family there will be no strong nation”. This brief statement highlights the fundamental device of creation and organization of the state through the traditional nuclear family, in which a clear and distinct separation of gender roles is essential to maintaining the needs of the community. President Erdoğan later returns to the topic of gender, and opens a parenthesis relating to the level of female parliamentary representation: “but, let me repeat it once again: for the first time in our Parliament, women started becoming MPs in our Parliament in 1935 and the representation level was quite low, even at the level of 1%. […] we fought so bravely that as of 2002 the representation level of our women in our Parliament increased gradually, thereby reaching the level of 17.4% as of today. There was a positive development concerning the representation of our women in society”. The speaker states: “we fought so bravely that the level of representation of our women in our Parliament has gradually increased”. It is particularly relevant for the analysis to note how Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gives himself and his party the credit for the increase in the number of female deputies, without ever referring to the feminist struggles carried out by women to achieve this goal. Rather, it appears that it was the party, the “we”, that achieved this result for “our women”.

In a subsequent portion of the text, President Erdoğan states that he is certain that “our women would be embracing the achievements made by our party and also they will embrace the century of Türkiye. We are expecting greater results from our women as we have tackled all their problems a short while ago”. It is observable how the previously illustrated mechanism, relating to the self-assignment by the speaking subject of the merit of the achievements with regard to female representation, is still present here and highlighted again. Furthermore, President Erdoğan states that he “expects greater results from our women, as we have solved all their problems for some time now”. From this statement emerges the speaking subject’s vision with respect to the gender issue, which he claims to have personally solved in all its ramifications.

The speech follows by opening the conclusion: “I would like to remind once again: we were in Mardin this week, and we have carried out the inauguration ceremony in Mardin and we have seen that the squares were full with people and Mardin was getting ready for the 2023 elections. Before then we were in Sanliurfa, likewise the squares were roaring, and we were in Gaziantep, the squares were full as well, and the other wing of the People's Alliance was in Mersin and our alliance is getting closer to the exit polls. So this solidarity, this togetherness, this unity of us doesn't resemble the unity of the Table of Six⁵. The Table of Six is ​​about to collapse. They have no energy whatsoever to walk this path. As long as we love each other with the understanding and the love created once for the sake of Creator, then we will accomplish and achieve anything. In every aspect of our lives women are contributing to our country. I greet them with love and respect”. In this part of the text the topic of women's rights is not mentioned, but ample space is left to the celebration of the successes achieved by the party during the recent rallies; furthermore, President Erdoğan seems to give himself and the AKP not only a political but also a religious mission, stating that they can achieve any result as long as they respect God's will.

This type of rhetoric continues when the speaker recounts a brief conversation he had with the President of Qatar: “you know this very well” I said to him, “that heaven lies under the feet of women, as the saying goes”. If you pay attention to heaven doesn’t lie under the feet of fathers but of mothers, and that’s why I said to my mother “let me kiss your feet” and she was indeed pulling her leg and I was saying to my mother that I would like to smell heaven! That’s why mothers and women are so important according to our understanding, so the opposition should know that, and shouldn’t attack our belief and they should stay within their limits and know their place”. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan underlines the importance of women solely as mothers, and entrusts them with an almost “angelic” role, describing the maternal figure as the one who resides in Heaven. Once again, the paternalistic feeling of the speaker towards the female figure, who must be protected and praised, is evident. Furthermore, according to what emerges from the speech, women must be protected only as mothers and beings of Paradise, but not as human subjects.

The following is an English transcript of a portion of President Erdoğan 's speech on International Women's Day, March 8th⁶, 2016: “in my opinion, the greatest wrong that you can do to a woman, is to restrict her to live a life where she is the victim of economic independence. You cannot put a price on the work of a mother, how can you put a price on this? It’s impossible, you cannot compare it. You cannot free women by destroying the notion of family or by rejecting our values: quite the opposite! This is a vision that opens the way to the exploitation of women”.​​ 

The following is an English transcript of a portion of Erdoğan’s speech on the occasion of the inauguration of the new headquarters of the Türkiye’s Women’s and Democracy Association (KADEM), June 5th, 2016⁷: “giving up on being a mother means giving up a part of humanity. I will go further and say it is to renounce all mankind. With no mothers, can humanity exist? No, if there are mothers there is humanity. That’s why at every opportunity I recommend having at least three children. The role of women in professional life should never overshadow their chances of being a mother”.​​ 

In these two short excerpts, President Erdoğan manages to condense his vision of the female role, which turns out to coincide entirely with the maternal one, to the point that the “renunciation of motherhood” is described as a “renunciation of all humanity”, and economic independence as a dangerous threat, “the worst thing that can be done to a woman”. Furthermore, by stating that “if there are no mothers, there is no humanity”, the burden of family care work is assigned entirely to the female figure, while there are no references to the role of fathers. The woman is thus assigned an almost divine responsibility, being described as the one who ensures the continuity of the human species.

Between Emine and Recep Tayyip, an analysis of the presidential couple

This short paragraph analyzes some public appearances of President Erdoğan and First Lady Emine Erdoğan, from which we can extrapolate the reproductive model and separation of gender roles that the couple is inspired by and of which they are symbols. A first example is the visit to Ankara, which took place on June 6th, 2024, by the Uzbek presidential couple. The official website of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye has dedicated more than one article to that day; a portion of the main article⁸​​ is reported below:​​ 

Holding a joint press conference with President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, President Erdoğan described their talks as productive, and said: “We are pleased that Turkish investments in Uzbekistan are increasing day by day. We will continue to encourage our businesspeople to enhance their investments in Uzbekistan and cultivate bonds that would deepen our partnership. “I take great joy in hosting President Mirziyoyev and his delegation in Ankara on the occasion of the Third Meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. In your presence, I would like to say ‘welcome’ once again. With my treasured friend, we established the Türkiye-Uzbekistan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2018. In 2022, we upgraded our relations to the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ level. And today, we successfully held the Third Meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council,” President Erdoğan said. Noting that today’s talks addressed steps to expand the partnership between Türkiye and Uzbekistan, President Erdoğan stated: “We discussed the concrete steps we could take in areas such as trade, agriculture, transportation, energy, culture, education and defense industry. We also signed numerous agreements as part of the council meeting. These agreements will help us diversify the cooperation between the two countries and strengthen its contractual basis. We are pleased that Turkish investments in Uzbekistan are increasing day by day. We will continue to encourage our businesspeople to enhance their investments in Uzbekistan and cultivate bonds that would deepen our partnership. We have already started to take necessary steps to rapidly implement the 107-point Action Plan signed at the end of the Seventh Term Meeting of the Türkiye-Uzbekistan Intergovernmental Mixed Economic Commission. The Business Forum held yesterday will also contribute to this. I am confident that we will achieve our $5bn trade volume target in the shortest period of time with the steps we will take.” ​​ Adding that Israel’s atrocities in Gaza were high on the agenda of their talks today, President Erdoğan said: “Today, besides our bilateral cooperation, we also exchanged views on regional and international issues considering the tough period our world is going through. One of the top agenda items of our deliberations was the inhuman attacks Israel has been conducting against Gaza for eight months. We view the Palestine issue from the same perspective as Uzbekistan. We reiterate our call to stop the oppression targeting innocent people in Gaza. I extend my thanks to my brother Mirziyoyev for supporting a free Palestinian state and the two-state solution. We are exerting every effort in our power to stop the war and deliver the humanitarian aid our brothers and sisters in Gaza are in need of. We also maintain our initiatives regarding all the legal processes, particularly at the International Court of Justice. Countries that supply Israel with ammunition and weapons for massacres must no longer be complicit in this crime. I once again call on all conscientious and responsible parties to take immediate action to establish a ceasefire”.

The article presented here is accompanied by a series of photographs portraying the meeting, including the following:

The following article⁹​​ describes the activities conducted on that same day by First Lady Emine Erdoğan and First Lady of Uzbekistan Mirziyoyeva.

Title:​​ First Lady Erdoğan meets with Uzbek First Lady Mirziyoyeva.​​ The full content of the article is the following:​​ First Lady Emine Erdoğan met with First Lady Ziroat Mirziyoyeva of Uzbekistan, who is accompanying President Shavkat Mirziyoyev on his official visit to Türkiye. As part of their meeting, the two First Ladies paid a visit to the Nation’s Library in Ankara.​​ Again, the article is accompanied by a series of photographs, including:

By comparing these two articles, it is possible to observe a very clear, sharp and distinct separation of gender roles, which is repeated not only on June 6th, 2024, but in a large number of public appearances of the Turkish presidential couple. First of all, it is possible to observe the assignment of "male" topics to President Erdoğan, including trade, regional agreements, military operations and energetic supplies. The First Lady is instead assigned reading books, tasting tea and appreciating traditional fabrics. It is also possible to observe a fundamental difference in the body language of the two spouses: while Recep Tayyip shows himself in an authoritarian and solemn attitude, Emine conveys a sense of modesty and courtesy. Through the review of the official website of the Republic of Türkiye, it emerges that, in general, First Lady Emine Erdoğan is portrayed publicly on occasions that concern environmentalism, motherhood, children's rights, cooking, art, reading and in regards of rights of the elderly. Some titles of articles dedicated to her are the following:​​ First Lady Erdoğan shares iftar with nursing home residents¹⁰, ​​First Lady Erdoğan meets with nurses and midwives¹¹,​​ First Lady Erdoğan attends the 'Meeting Point of Centuries-old Delights: Turkish Cuisine in Seven Regions' event¹²,​​ First Lady Erdoğan visits 'Center for Supporting Children in Difficult Life Situations' in Astana¹³,​​ First Lady Erdoğan meets with Voluntary Envoys and protective families¹⁴. Furthermore, on several occasions, Recep Tayyip is immortalized while praying or carrying out other religious functions.

In a speech reported in an article dated July 27th, 2024¹⁵, President Erdoğan identifies Türkiye and its political work as​​ the conscience of humanity that stands against oppression. In the speech, the speaker clearly and decisively positions himself against the genocide currently underway in Palestine, siding with the oppressed subjects, recognizing the presence of an asymmetrical power relationship and highlighting the crimes against humanity committed by Israel and Western imperialism. President Erdoğan is therefore capable of recognizing the systematic oppression of subaltern subjects in the context of ethnic power relations, while continuing to perpetuate the same dynamic of women’s submission to men. It is from this fact that the fundamental theoretical question of this article arises, which asks whether it is possible to achieve a liberation movement that can be useful to all subaltern subjects, without the protection of the rights of one minority oppressing those of another; the article hopes to be able to open a debate in these regards. In an almost specular manner, in fact, the Turkish opposition, direct heir of the original Kemalism and supported by most Western forces, sides with the feminist struggle, without however recognizing the rights of some ethnic minorities. In fact, the electoral campaign carried out by the CHP in view of the 2023 presidential elections was based on two key points: the expulsion of the Arab population refugee in Türkiye and the implementation of a series of reforms to protect women's rights¹⁶. It is therefore observable how both parties stand up to protect the rights of some people to the detriment of others; in the first case of ethnic minorities but limited to men, and in the second case of women but limited to Turkish women, with the necessary precautions. This article argues that this dynamic is much more deep-rooted and broader than the local clash between AKP and CHP, and that involves more generally the relations between the Western world and Southwest Asia, in which the female body serves as an ideological watershed.

A case of contemporary Orientalism: the Islamic Republic of Iran​​ 

The following paragraphs aim to fit into the post-colonial and feminist theoretical tradition of international relations, drawing inspiration from the teachings of great scholars of critical theories such as Cynthia Enloe and Edward Said. Taking as a model the revolutionary text published by the latter in 1978,​​ Orientalism, the paragraphs presented appropriate the concept of distorted representation of territories and populations "othered" by the West as a justification of colonial domination first and neocolonial influence later. It also attempts to resume the methodology used by Said through the analysis of some articles published in recent years by Western press, which, according to this article, contribute to the persistence of distorted beliefs regarding other territories and the populations that inhabit them, in relation, specifically, to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In conjunction with this thought, the hypothesis already developed by scholars such as Frederick Cooper on the so-called colonial encounter is resumed, according to which the creation of a fundamental otherness between “us Westerners” and “them”, between “the West and the rest”, is preparatory not only to the creation of the identity of the Other, but also of one’s own, which is characterized by being “what they are not”. Similarly, the chapter is openly inspired by the book​​ The Invention of Africa​​ (1988) by Valentin-Yves Mudimbe, from which it takesthe concept of colonial epistemology. It is through the latter that Mudimbe identifies “the invention” of the African continent, which is systematically presented and reproduced according to images that are very far from being plausible, and which are, rather, functional to the satisfaction of the colonial and neocolonial desires of the West.

The following paragraphs take the hypotheses present in The Invention of Africa and attempt to demonstrate their validity, with the necessary differences and specifications, for the Iranian territory and its population. In addition to recognizing the need for knowledge to be decolonized, this article simultaneously highlights the need to de-androcentrize it. To this end, it takes as a model some important texts that founded the feminist theory of international relations, such as​​ Bananas, Beaches and Bases​​ (1989) by Cynthia Enloe, or​​ Sexual Politics (1971) by Kate Millet, from which emerges the fundamental impossibility of reaching an accurate level of analysis of global politics in the absence of the study of the dynamics of gender oppression by which they are structured. The present paragraphs take up the results of some investigations carried out by Michel Foucault in​​ La Volonté de Savoir​​ (1978), giving particular importance to the concept of biopower, described therein as a set of techniques of control of sexuality that aim to manage not only the individual body, but also the life of the population as a whole. The article presented here fully supports the aim of the critical theories under examination, in the full belief that the deconstruction of discourse, both in post-colonial and feminist terms, represents the first step towards the construction of a more sustainable society. The article also places itself in an intersectional manner between the two approaches, underlining the close co-dependence of the asymmetrical power relations between ethnic groups and between genders, which structure and reinforce each other. The article hopes to be able to contribute to the strengthening of the intersectional feminist movement, in the belief that the liberation of a minority can only occur in union with the liberation of all the others, and that feminist fight is not only related to the individual freedom of women, but to a real collective transformation.

Among the texts with a greater degree of intersectionality to which the chapter refers are​​ Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest​​ (1995) by scholar Anne McClintock, from which the fundamental concept of porno-tropics and the sexualization of “other” bodies and territories as an integral part of the colonial and neocolonial process is taken. The main analytical result achieved by McClintock, and which is taken as a theoretical assumption here, is that an allusive reduction of “other” bodies and cultures to objects of sexual desire for white men is constantly constructed. According to the scholar, moreover, this construction is functional to the control and exploitation of territories, from which the Islamic Republic of Iran, examined in these paragraphs, is not exempt. They are also inspired, to a minimal extent, by the thought of scholars such as Giulietta Stefani and Ronald Hyam, whose texts are fundamental for understanding the historical evolution of ethnic and gender relations in the colonial context; in particular, Stefani's analysis of the influence that colonial history has had on the creation of gender identities in Italy and, by extension and analogy, in the West, is highlighted as particularly relevant for the purposes of this article. The function of the colonial encounter defined as boomerang is therefore underlined, for which the dynamics of power and sexuality are reflected in social changes both in the ex-colonial territories and in the ex-homeland.

The paragraphs are structured through two main thematic axes, the first of which is represented by an analysis of the law called​​ Protection, Dignity and Security of Women against Violence Bill, approved by the Iranian Parliament in August 2023, whose purpose is to combat gender-based violence both in the domestic and social spheres. From this analysis, an attempt is made to reveal the current condition of women in Iran and the social changes taking place, although it is recognized that this single source cannot provide a complete description, for which I refer to future studies. The second thematic axis is connected to the first through the painful event involving the death of Mahsa Amini, which occurred in the custody of the Iranian police in September 2022. In particular, not only the reasons for the death of the twenty-two-year-old girl will be analyzed, but also the ways in which this event was presented by Western press, in an attempt to create a fundamental otherness, and which cannot but be analyzed as an integral part of the historical processes that have affected Iran and Western imperialism from the early twentieth century onwards. Finally, the chapter resumes the analysis of Western discourse regarding the use of the hijab by Muslim women, inserting it into the broader discourse on contemporary Orientalism.

The Protection, Dignity and Security Against Violence Bill

What first caught my attention during the preliminary research for this chapter is the presence of several articles about the Protection, Dignity and Security Against Violence Bill (hereafter referred to as​​ Bill) in the Iranian and Southwest Asian press, yet it is completely absent from all major Western media outlets, including big names such as the Washington Post, the New York Times, the BBC or Le Monde, among others. Yet, as discussed later in this chapter, the Western press is not at all silent on the issue of Iranian women’s rights. The main outlets covering the important topic of the Bill internationally are Al Jazeera, the Tehran Times, and the Iran Press News Agency, which are used as sources here. An article published by Al Jazeera in February 2021¹⁷​​ reports the following information:

The bill’s dozens of articles and provisions offer up a new definition for violence against women, set up new responsibilities for various state-run agencies, and envision new support systems. The legislation defines violence as “any behavior inflicted on women due to sexuality, vulnerable position or type of relationship, and inflicts harm to their body, psyche, personality and dignity, or restricts or deprives them of legal rights and freedoms”. It envisages the formation of a fund by the judiciary to support victims of violence, provide teachings on “life and job skills” to imprisoned women, and contribute to paying blood money to families of women murdered by men. The draft law says the judiciary can issue a protection order in case of a serious threat of harm to a survivor of violence or her children, which can include a restraining order, obliging the husband to attend therapy, or transfer the victim and her children to a safe house. It also contains provisions aimed at boosting job creation for vulnerable women, and reducing or managing working hours for employed women who need to spend more family time. It further advocates more comprehensive insurance coverage for housewives. The bill dedicates a significant portion of its provisions to education and expanding knowledge and know-how on women’s issues. For instance, in addition to obligating the judiciary to create offices tasked with providing support to victims of violence, it calls for organizing educational courses for judges and other judiciary staff. If passed into law¹⁸, it will obligate the state broadcaster to produce more programs that promote the support of women and the prevention of violence against them as family values. It sees a role for the ministry of education in holding courses for students, teachers and parents, and in better identifying vulnerable students. The legislation also includes the ministry of health, law enforcement and prison organizations among others as part of its vision. […] While the legislation criminalizes various forms of violence against women including forced marriage, sexual harassment in public and physical and psychological abuse, it does not criminalize marital rape and virginity testing, or abolish child marriage. […] Laws that aim to deter individuals from harmful behavior, Ebtekar said, tend to be more uniform, and are contained in the government’s proposed legislation. “The innovations predicted in this bill have created a smooth path to combat violence proportionate to the necessities and needs of Iranian women and within the frameworks of Iranian religion and culture”, she told Al Jazeera. “This bill pays attention to three important and vital elements in women’s issues: the dignity and position of women, their rights, and their security at home and in society. Considering how important these three elements are, if the bill is passed, approaches toward the elements will change and will be reformed. This will be the most important thing for women’s issues.” […] An Iran researcher at the HRW told Al Jazeera that, like other legislative reforms that have had a positive effect on the situation of human rights in Iran, this bill could also help build consensus among different factions of governance. “I think this bill with all its shortcoming is still an attempt to recognize the importance of providing adequate legal protection for women in society, and creates opportunities to push the authorities to do more awareness raising, and even for lawyers who work on protecting survivors of violence”, Tara Sepehri Far said. “I think this law is also going to contribute to empowering women to demand better protections, but it does not go far enough to address all the issues”. The HRW researcher noted that, like other countries, legislation on women’s rights is easily politicized in Iran and has been slow-moving, but a majority of authorities dealing with social issues recognize the need for reform. “Iranian women and the civil society have been shaping the cultural shift that is probably facilitated by easier access to information through social media”, Sepehri Far said. “You can’t deny the fact that there is a lot more societal sensitivity about issues such as femicide and violence against women with media openly discussing them, and this will continue to create pressure on elected officials to take action”.

What emerges from reading the key points of the Bill is that, despite some significant shortcomings, the law is revolutionary in its approach to combating gender violence in the territory, ranging from the issues of physical and psychological violence, domestic violence, sexual harassment and the strengthening of the female educational and work sector. Even the researcher Tara Sepehri Far, who deals with the observation of human rights abuse in Iran and Kuwait, seems to agree with the idea that the Bill represents a great step forward for women's rights in the Islamic Republic, despite underlining the presence of important gaps. The proposed article quotes the words of the academic and Islamic feminist Masoumeh Ebtekar, at the time Vice President of Iran for Women and Family, whose work on the Bill was of fundamental importance for its successful approval, who underlines the fruitful outcome highlighted in the Bill of the intersection between the protection and safeguard of women's rights and the Iranian religious and cultural framework. For the purposes of this article, it is relevant to open a brief parenthesis on the representation in the West of the Islamic feminist Masoumeh Ebtekar herself, of which some examples are reported:​​ 

¹⁹

In this post published in August 2021 by Vanity Fair Italia, the Iranian academic is described as “the great Satan for us”, with an obvious negative connotation. In an article²⁰​​ published by Radio Liberty we read, in reference to the choice by Ebtekar’s son to continue his studies as a doctoral student in the United States:​​ as Sadjadpour notes, ‘several of the prominent hostage takers of 1979 came to realize they were stupid kids whose actions had profoundly negative consequences,’ but Ebtekar, he says, ‘has never expressed remorse.’ To former U.S. hostage and State Department official John Limbert, the irony that sons of the Islamic Revolution are studying in the United States is exasperating. Limbert was among those held captive for 444 days, during which time he was subjected to psychological torture. ‘[Ebtekar] and her husband built their careers on yelling ‘'Death to America,'’ he says. ‘Aren’t they ashamed of themselves?’ Limbert asks. ‘It would be okay if they would simply say we screwed up’. This short portion of text shows the contempt of the speakers towards Masoumeh Ebtekar and all those who participated in the 1979 Revolution, described as “stupid kids”. It is interesting for the purposes of the chapter presented to note how similar media representations persist in Western press, but there is no trace that reports the approval of the Bill.

Mahsa Amini’s Murder

The event that has, instead, gained wide notoriety on the international scene, is represented by the tragic death of Mahsa Amini, which occurred on September 16th, 2022, while the young twenty-two-year-old girl of Kurdish origins was in the custody of the Iranian police for an alleged violation of the rules on compulsory hijab. According to the majority of international sources, the cause of Mahsa Amini's death consisted of mistreatment by the police (who, however, deny this information) which led the girl to a coma prior to death. The event was the cause of the outbreak of a series of protests that resonated in the Western world, which has shown its solidarity with Iranian protestants. However, the tragic murder of Amini has become, unfortunately, part of the important international dynamics that involve the difficult relations between the West and South-West Asia, and which instrumentalize the female body. A first example of this can be read in the following article²¹, published by France Inter four days after Amini's death:​​ 

Title: Young woman killed for a hair out of place makes Iranians explode

Mahsa Amini was a 22-year-old Iranian woman. Last week, while she was visiting Tehran with her family, a squad stopped her because a lock of hair was visible under her veil. Three days later, Mahsa was dead. And the anger of young Iranians exploded. For forty years now, since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the mullahs in power have decided how women should dress, what they can show and what they should hide. In these forty years there have been ups and downs, between moments of tolerance and moments of inquisitorial conservatism. Generation after generation, Iranian women have tried to free themselves from these chains. The new generation exerts particularly strong pressure, with the help of social networks on which they challenge the moral order. […] Mahsa Amini’s death was the detonator of an omnipresent cultural, social and political frustration. Just as the suicide of a fruit-seller had sparked the Tunisian revolution in 2011, the death in unclear conditions of the young Iranian woman due to a lock of hair has opened Pandora’s box. On social networks, girls are cutting their hair in front of cameras in solidarity with Mahsa. Some are even burning their hair. It is a symbolic protest in a country in chains. […] As the past teaches us, we must not underestimate the regime’s willingness to do anything to maintain power. The international climate, with the nuclear negotiations now at an impasse and the rapprochement between Tehran and Putin’s Russia, does not allow for a tolerant approach. Rarely have we seen such a wide rift between the religious elders at the helm of the state and the young people who only ask to live freely. In Iran, as in Afghanistan after the return of the Taliban, women are the first victims of theocratic power. They resist as best they can and for this they deserve all our respect and admiration.​​ 

It is possible to carry out a critical analysis of the text starting from the title:​​ young woman killed for a hair out of place, where the difficult religious question regarding the use of the hijab by women and the related obligation is reduced to the expression “a hair out of place”, which turns out to be an element that rather minimizes the theme. Continuing in the text, the sentence​​ for forty years now, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the mullahs in power have decided how women should dress, what they can show and what they should hide​​ is certainly explanatory of the political repression to which Iranian citizens are subjected, but it is limited to a summary that is as superficial as it risks being misleading. The article continues, stating that​​ generation after generation, Iranian women have tried to free themselves from these chains. The new generation exerts particularly strong pressure, with the help of social networks on which it challenges the moral order. […] Mahsa Amini’s death was the detonator of an omnipresent cultural, social and political frustration. The metaphor of the chains, which reappears a second time later, is particularly strong, and does not hesitate to express a moral judgment. It is particularly relevant to note how Mahsa Amini’s death is called “the detonator of a cultural frustration” as well as a social and political one, inevitably tying the event to the real Iranian culture rather than to the patriarchal social structure of the state. The portion of the text from which the orientalist approach, understood as the construction of an otherness functional to the neocolonial control of the territory, is most evident is the following:​​ as the past teaches us, we must not underestimate the regime’s willingness to do anything to maintain power. The international climate, with the nuclear negotiations now at an impasse and the rapprochement between Tehran and Putin’s Russia, does not leave any hope for a tolerant approach. It is possible to observe the juxtaposition between the image of a despotic regime and Iran’s choice not to align itself with Western international policies on nuclear power, a topic that does not seem to be relevant in the context of Amini’s death. The article concludes with the following sentences:​​ in Iran, as in Afghanistan after the return of the Taliban, women are the first victims of theocratic power. They resist as they can and for this they deserve all our respect and admiration. It is clear that the article only analyzes the way in which political Islam interferes with women’s rights, using Iran and Afghanistan as examples, but does not in any way allude to the degrading effects resulting from the politicization of other religions, such as the war against the right to abortion carried out in the United States and other Western states in the same period. Finally, the concluding sentence​​ they resist as they can and for this they deserve all our respect and admiration​​ appears to be particularly paternalistic in its expression. It is in this way that the painful murder of Amini fits into a complex system of representation of otherness and relations in continuous evolution at least since the D'Arcy concession (Bunton, Cleveland, 2016).

The international resonance that the Amini case has had has undoubtedly increased the involvement of global public opinion on the Iranian political system, in which there has been great participation in solidarity, but it has also been used by various populist regimes in order to intensify their hate campaigns against Islam, in which the topic of the hijab is often the protagonist. An example of this is the following post, published on the official Facebook profile²²​​ of the Italian Vice President of the Council of Ministers Matteo Salvini on August 15th, 2024:

In the post, Salvini says:​​ The Iranian police shoots to a mother of two children leaving her paralyzed, due to the only fault of not using the veil correctly while driving. An unworthy shame. No space in Europe for antidemocratic regimes who suffocate women’s and girls’ rights.​​ In this post, Salvini stands up for women's rights and the freedom that women should have to make choices about their own bodies, despite being a political figure who is openly anti-abortion and in favor of family traditionalism. The last sentence, and specifically with "no space in Europe", the Minister alludes to the desire to tighten Italian immigration policies. In this post, the instrumentalization of the female body and the construction of otherness for the purpose of achieving one's own political purpose are therefore very evident and clear.

The following text is taken from an article published by Vita²³:

Title: Bathing with a veil? It’s sexier than a bikini

If there’s one thing that particularly irritates me in the summer, besides mosquitoes, it’s the “blah blah blah” that revolves around the “problem of problems”: the swimsuit test. The media start making us feel guilty already after Easter, when we still have the taste of Easter cake and chocolate in our mouths, emphasizing the fact that we were too lazy and didn’t sign up to the gym this year either. Then they cover you with crash diets and reassure you by telling you that even Valeria Marini or the celebrity of the moment has been struck by the evil cellulite. Blessed, but I have to admit that all this blah blah blah has never touched me that much. And the same indifference concerns many second-generation friends that I have questioned on the subject. First of all, because few of us spend our holidays on the beaches and under the sun of the Bel Paese, and many return to their countries of origin to embrace their loved ones. Then, as my friend Samiha explained to me, she has defeated the problem of the swimsuit test... by wearing the veil. She no longer has the problem of the bikini, the one-piece swimsuit or the burkini, a sort of chaste costume permitted by Islam. But she wears pants and a shirt and goes swimming when there are few people on the beach, so as not to "annoy anyone", she says, and not to feel like other people are watching her. I have often seen veiled women emerge from the waves in Egypt and Tunisia, but also in Liguria, like Venus de Milo, completely soaked in water: the result was to attract even more attention from those present, also because the wet clothes on make the shapes stand out even more. The result? The “see-through” effect and the clumsy attempt to “unveil” hidden shapes by playing with one’s imagination becomes, especially in Italy, an intriguing pastime for those under the beach umbrella.

This short text fits perfectly into the tradition defined as porno-tropics, studied by great academics such as Anne McClintock in the context of postcolonial feminist studies. The concept of porno-tropics highlights how non-Western territories and bodies, and especially female bodies, are constantly sexualized and reduced to objects of desire for the white man, and how this is functional to the hegemonic control of "other" territories and cultures (McClintock, 1995). The text under analysis demonstrates how the concept of porno-tropics is still valid. The analysis of the complex theme of ideal female body representations, fatphobia and models of beauty present in this article is deferred to future studies, in order to specifically extrapolate the intersection between gender oppression and ethnic oppression, that can be highlighted in the representation of the Muslim female figure depicted here. In the sentence​​ as my friend Samiha explained to me, she has defeated the problem of the swimsuit test… by wearing the veil, a religious practice such as the use of the hijab is compared to reasons of aesthetic insecurities, which are not, usually, the reason why one wears the hijab, thus reproducing a misleading representation. The sexualization of the Muslim female figure is particularly evident in the juxtaposition between veiled women and the Venus de Milo, which is a statue depicted in almost complete nudity, generating a metaphorical oxymoron. The process of sexualization becomes even more explicit with the sentence​​ the ‘see-through’ effect and the clumsy attempt to ‘un-veil’ by playing with the imagination the hidden forms,​​ suggesting the idea that Muslim women choose to get wet while dressed to highlight their sexuality by “un-veiling” themselves.

The mayor of Monfalcone (Italy), Anna Maria Cisint, makes bathing dressed a question of decorum, as can be read in the following article by Open²⁴:

The League’s mayor of Monfalcone (Gorizia), Anna Maria Cisint, returns to attack the Muslim community of the city. For the mayor, "the behavior of Muslim foreigners who habitually enter the water with their clothes is unacceptable", we read in the open letter, addressed to the local Muslim community. The "practice" in question would cause "dismay" among the bathers of the Marina Julia beach and would create "unbearable consequences for the protection of decorum and hygiene, generating the overturning of every rule of social coexistence", writes Cisint who then adds: "those who come from different realities from ours have the obligation to respect the rules and customs. The practice – she continues – of accessing the beach and the water with clothing other than bathing suits must stop and I intend to apply these principles with a specific provision to protect the general interest of the city and our fellow citizens”.

The League’s mayor therefore associates the act of getting wet with clothes on with poor personal hygiene and dirt, inserting herself into a traditional orientalist discourse that describes the other as primitive and “uncivilized”. In conclusion, this chapter contains several examples of how contemporary narrative is still exquisitely Eurocentric and colonialist, and how it uses the female body to achieve its goals. The case of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a particularly representative paradigm, however this article does not waver in the belief that such reasoning can expand and assist the birth of a theory on the deconstruction of knowledge that is also valid for many other subaltern realities.

The Intrinsic Significance of Türkiye’s Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention and Iranian Feminist Associationism as a Local and Global Response to Gender Oppression

The following chapter presents itself as a useful condensed analysis of the two case studies present here. In regards of Türkiye, it is impossible not to mention here the sensational exit from the Istanbul Convention that took place under the Erdoğan administration on July 1st, 2021; an event that shook not only the Turkish public opinion, but also the international’s. A brief recap of the contents of the Convention is followed by a presentation of what are, according to Funda Hülagü and other scholars of the neo-Marxist feminist current, the causes that led the country out of the European pact against gender violence. The neo-Marxist approach is, according to the meaning proposed here, a critical theory of international relations, which origins from original Marxism and which, however, extends the asymmetric power dynamics that involve class relations to relations between states, identifying oppressor and oppressed countries. It arises from Lenin's theories on imperialism, Gramsci's hegemony, reaching a peak in Wallerstein's world-system (Rupert, 2016). Neo-Marxism appears to be related to political economy, transcending, however, from the latter, including itself in the interest of various disciplines; neo-Marxist feminist theory finds in economic inequalities the main causes of the maintenance of the patriarchal system, identifying, in the same economic policies, the resolving glimmers. It is through these methodological lenses that Hülagü, and the following paragraphs, attempt to explain the crisis, defined as "anti-feminist", which led to Türkiye’s exit from the Convention signed in Istanbul only nine years earlier.

Subsequently, the historical development of the feminist movement in Iran from the end of the nineteenth century to today is briefly analyzed, using Vanzan's studies as the main source. It is through the analysis of this historical parable that the Iranian feminist movement is highlighted as absolutely unique and resilient, capable of transforming and adapting to the political contingencies, even very abrupt ones, that the country has experienced in contemporary times, managing to always maintain its own specificity and authenticity strong and constant. According to this article, Iranian feminism can be proposed as an effective response to gender oppression, which is valid not only for Iran, but from which one can derive, with the necessary studies and time to dedicate to it, a more universally valid theoretical model of feminist struggle, at least in Southwest Asia.

The Istanbul Convention​​ 

The Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, commonly known as the Istanbul Convention, is an international treaty aimed at combating gender-based violence and domestic violence. Approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2011, the Convention aims to prevent violence, protect victims and ensure that perpetrators do not go unpunished. In March 2012, Türkiye became the first state to ratify the agreement, from which it withdrew in 2021 by order of President Erdoğan. It characterizes violence against women as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination (art. 3, letter a). Countries should exercise due diligence in preventing violence, protecting victims and prosecuting perpetrators (art. 5). The Convention is the first international treaty to contain a definition of gender. In fact, in art. 3, letter a), it defines violence against women as a violation of human rights and a form of discrimination. In letter c), gender is defined as "socially constructed roles, behaviors, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men". In addition, the treaty establishes a series of crimes characterized by violence against women. States should include these in their penal codes or other forms of legislation or should include them, if they do not already exist, in their legal systems. The crimes covered by the Convention are: psychological violence (art. 33); stalking (art. 34); physical violence (art. 35), sexual violence, including rape (art. 36); forced marriage (art. 37); female genital mutilation (art. 38), forced abortion and forced sterilization (art. 39); sexual harassment (art. 40). Article 4 prohibits certain types of discrimination by stating that the implementation of the provisions of the Convention by the Parties, in particular measures to protect the rights of victims, shall be ensured without discrimination on grounds of sex, gender, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, membership of a national minority, wealth, birth, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, state of health, disability, marital status, migrant or refugee status or any other status. The Convention also includes an article targeting “crimes of honor” (Article 42).

The reasons behind the withdrawal: a neo-Marxist analysis of political economy

In her book​​ Mobilisierungen gegen Feminismus und ‘Gender’​​ (2021), Marburg University’s academic Funda Hülagü provides a critical analysis of the possible reasons that led Türkiye to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention. Specifically, she traces the current moment experienced by AKP’s Türkiye, which she describes as an “anti-feminist” moment, to causes of socio-economic origin. The author inevitably links the sustenance of the capitalist nation with the reproductive capacities of its population; according to this point of view, therefore, it was the economic crisis of the 2000s and 2010s that led to the current moment and, consequently, to the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, along with a strong predisposition of President Erdoğan’s government. The thought of several feminist and neo-Marxist scholars (Vogel, 2013; Weeks, 2007; Ferguson, 2016) is resumed, according to which the capitalist state requires the stipulation of a social and sexual contract for its own functioning. For example, it is considered how unpaid female domestic work greatly lightens the need for the neoliberal state to create social services and welfare policies. Thus, Hülagü's essay describes the process of housewifization currently underway in South-West Asia and North Africa as a way used by the respective governments to stem the economic crisis (it is shown in the essay that, however, housewifization does not contribute to the improvement in the conditions of the latter).

The author highlights a particularly relevant fact: in the last fifteen years, the number of femicides committed in Türkiye has more than doubled, as has the number of deaths on the workplace, especially in the construction sector, which is predominantly male. In recent years, a section of the population has identified what they call the “feminist state” as the reason for the decline in their quality of life. These groups, organized under the name of the National Will Platform, have fought on two very specific issues: “early marriages” and the payment of alimony after divorce. In a period of economic crisis such as that of the last twenty years, which is still ongoing today, the demands of anti-feminist groups have found strong support in the state apparatus. For example, TIHEK, the Turkish Institution for Human Rights and Equality, which is (or should be) an autonomous public body, has sided with these groups, arguing for the need to “restore gender justice” and highlight the “invisibility of men’s suffering”, who “are killed in greater numbers than women” (Hülagü, 2021). One of the reasons used to justify the exit from the Istanbul Convention was precisely gender violence: the conservative wing of the population argued, in fact, that the exponential increase in the number of femicides that occurred in the 2010s was attributable to the advent of the Convention. According to this reasoning, the introduction of policies favorable to gender equality left men with no choice but to “become frustrated” and, therefore, to express their anger in violence. Furthermore, the mainstream conservative narrative argues that laws supporting the protection of women's rights, such as the Istanbul Convention, are not the will of Turkish people, but rather an expression of Western imperialistic desire (Hülagü, 2021).

Hülagü traces, therefore, in the struggles in favor of “early marriages” and against the payment of post-divorce alimony, two major forces that led Türkiye to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention. In regards of the first case, the campaign began to take shape when, in 2016, the traditionalist political wing proposed lowering the age of consent from fifteen to twelve. The proposal envisaged that men convicted of pedophilia would receive amnesty if they married their victims, where the sexual acts were committed “without violence, threats or other restrictions on consent”. The social groups in favor of “early marriages” supported (and continue to support) the idea according to which “early marriage” is described and stigmatized as a “child bride phenomenon” by feminist movements, who “say they are in favor of the freedom to flirt at thirteen, but not of the freedom to marry”. According to this logic, feminist movements oppose the concept of the family nucleus while they favor the sexualization of bodies, thus undermining the rights of “those young people who want to get married rather than flirt”. The current laws would therefore be to the detriment of those pre-adolescent couples who want to start a family but cannot, because, in these couples, men are accused of rape by the current legislation. According to the truly aberrant point of view of these conservative groups, the consequence of these laws (laws favoring gender equality) would be a family model in which the entirety of the care work falls on the woman, given the man's detention for rape, creating an unfavorable situation for the wife²⁵.

The second driver to which the author attributes the current anti-feminist moment in Türkiye is the campaign against post-divorce alimony payments. According to its supporters, alimony payments are something that a man is condemned to for life upon separation. According to the National Will Platform movement, the supposedly exaggerated burden that divorced men are subjected to would therefore become a source of great frustration for ex-husbands, who would end up killing their ex-wives and committing suicide (Hülagü, 2021). However, research conducted by Akçabay in 2019 shows otherwise: in most cases, Turkish men do not pay alimony, which is mostly assigned on the basis of the maintenance needs of children (Akçabay, 2019).

Funda Hülagü's conclusion on the exit from the Istanbul Convention is therefore that the advent of deep anti-feminism in Türkiye is due, in addition to the government's choices, to the twenty-year economic crisis that the country has had to face, and which has resulted in the extension of patriarchal norms as a (failed) strategy for solving problems. In light of this, it is particularly relevant for the purposes of this article to underline the strong complexity of the phenomenon under examination, which is not only a question of gender but also a question of class, of relations with the Western world, and much more. This article is not the right place to discuss each of the elements that contribute to the composition of the phenomenon; however, it attempts to highlight the need for an approach that is as intersectional as possible within feminist studies and social sciences more generally. One of the questions that I try to answer here is related to the possibility of communion between the anti-colonialist and feminist struggles; a possibility that is considered absolutely necessary. In this regard, it is believed that a particularly effective example of this can be found in Iranian feminist associationism, to which the following paragraphs are dedicated.

Developments of Iranian feminism from Nasir al-Din Shah to today

The Italian scholar Anna Vanzan has written extensively on Iran and women's rights, and for this reason the academic tradition owes much to her. Vanzan has identified several intrinsic characteristics of Iranian feminism, tracing its historical parable (Vanzan, 2005). From her studies it emerges that, at the end of the nineteenth century, the feminist movement evolved from within the Qajar harem. A very characteristic feature of feminism in Iran, which has always characterized it and continues to do so, is the combination of the feminist cause and the protection of national sovereignty and Iranian culture. In 1891, for example, the royal women broke their pipes and refused to smoke with the Shah, organizing a smoking strike, on the occasion of the cessation of the tobacco monopoly to a private British company. Another equally important fact noted by Vanzan is that relating to the strong cooperation between the harem and the ulama, who had at heart the cause of protecting the nation from Western imperialism; and, above all, enjoyed popular support. The development of the feminist movement within the royal house is traced back to the higher level of education enjoyed by the Shah's relatives compared to the rest of Iranian women; in fact, there were no public schools accessible to girls²⁶, and therefore education remained the prerogative of those few girls born into wealthy families, often daughters of intellectuals, who could afford private schooling.

A great woman and historical symbol of feminism in Iran was the daughter of Nasir al-Din Shah, Taj al-Soltaneh, who was a member of the Women's Freedom Association, one of the very first feminist associations in the plateau, which fought especially for women's right to education. Many men were members of the Association, many of whom had spent a period of time abroad, coming into contact with different feminist realities, and convinced of the fact that society as a whole would have greatly benefited from progress in the condition of women. In her personal diary, published as a book of memoirs entitled​​ Khaterat​​ (Ettehadiye, Sa'advandiyan, 1983), the princess expresses her reflections on gender issues, and it is possible to derive from them the most discussed topics in that period by feminist associations: the right to vote, the right to a formal education, the right to choose one's own clothing or the right to have a job outside of the domestic walls, among others. Taj al-Soltaneh was not the only princess to be part of the Association; many others are remembered, such as Eftekhar al-Soltaneh (Vanzan, 2005).

In addition to being born within the royal harem and sharing the cause of protecting the country from imperialism, another fundamental characteristic of Iranian feminism, which has accompanied its developments up to the present day, is the very extensive use of journalism. At the beginning of the movement, feminists published several periodicals which, however, were often subject to government censorship. The most discussed topics were the phenomenon of child brides, the right to divorce, the right to work, the right to health and, last but not least, the right to education. Furthermore, already at the time, Iranian feminism did not reject Islam as a religion in itself, but rather recognized a patriarchal pattern in the use that many men made of it, thus separating its political use from Islamic spirituality. This fact is particularly relevant if we consider that, over time, Iranian feminism, like other feminisms that arose in Muslim-majority countries, distanced itself from the Western world and its precepts, and also from white feminism. It is therefore relevant that the first protest organized by Iranian women in this era was against the Russian government. In 1911, in fact, Iranian women decided to protest in the streets wearing chadors, firstly outside the Parliament and then at the Russian Consulate in Tehran, outside whose headquarters great Iranian intellectuals such as Zeinab Amin, co-founder of the National Society of Women, spoke. It was to Western imperialism that, in this period, the movement attributed the blame for the backwardness of women's conditions, which is why the comparison between the two causes was not at all coincidental.​​ 

However, the different souls that constituted the movement did not always agree on their goals and methods: the National Society of Women, for example, was more oriented towards the protection of national sovereignty, while the Association for Women's Freedom was more committed to purely feminist objectives. However, they all had as their primary objective the expansion of women's right in education.

In fact, the rate of female schooling increased significantly in the following decade, and in 1923 the League of Patriots was born, which was concerned with the literacy of adult women. The same League was also concerned with offering help and assistance to women in conditions of poverty, who were included in processes of social and work integration that saw the creation of women's cooperatives. It was also concerned with the foundation of hospitals and with providing assistance to orphaned girls. These activities were also accompanied by the publication of feminist magazines and school textbooks. It was precisely the League of Patriots that organized and hosted, in 1932, the first International Women's Congress, in which many feminists from the rest of the Islamic world took part. The latter shared the need to distance themselves from Western imperialism and to create a strong indigenous associative base in Southwest Asia and North Africa.

However, this period of great ferment was interrupted by the arrival of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the inauguration of state feminism. In 1936, inspired by Kemalist policies, the use of the hijab was abolished by law, with the police ripping it off women's heads. The apparently "progressive" laws brought forward by Reza Shah were not really aimed at improving the condition of women, as attested by the maintenance of male rather than universal suffrage. It was during the dictatorship of Reza Shah Pahlavi that some clandestine feminist associations were formed, sometimes within the Tudeh. However, the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, characterized by greater openness than his father's reign, saw an increase in the presence of employed women, which gave rise to the birth of various professional associations, which were also accompanied by new associations organized on an ethnic-cultural basis, such as the Association of Jewish Women.​​ 

The period of the so-called “White Revolution” led to enormous interference by the State in all areas, including the feminist movement, of which many associations were closed to be replaced by the Organization of Women of Iran, whose president was the Shah’s twin sister, and vice-president his mother-in-law. The Organization, teeming with royal personalities, supported the feminist movement as long as it did not interfere with the will of the crown, and limited itself to the creation of cultural activities without going into politics. The female image promoted by the Shah and the Organization was that of the modern Westernized woman, but who remained subordinate to the male figure and respectful of family hierarchies. The policies of state feminism led to several consequences, both positive and negative; among the first, there was the entry, for the first time, of Iranian female figures into certain professional orders, such as the legal profession and the academic world. Among the negative aspects, one must certainly remember the widening of the gap existing between women of different social classes: in fact, those who benefited most from state policies were those belonging to the elite, while the same policies remained inaccessible to the majority of women in the country. Furthermore, the Women's Organization of Iran, like all other state apparatuses, was also affected by the rampant corruption in the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah (Fathi, 1982).

The beginning of the Revolution marked a very strong involvement by the entire population, regardless of gender and other contingent factors. During the revolutionary period, women devoted themselves entirely to the anti-colonial cause, often playing roles considered “masculine”, such as that of fighting urban guerrillas. The role of the chador, a garment that many women reappropriated during the Revolution, and which became a symbol against forced Westernization, and at the same time also an emblem of the fight against white patriarchy, was particularly relevant. Covered by the chador, in fact, Iranian women were all equal, beyond the aesthetic and physical factors of each one, in a condition of democratic equality, “like men”. Those who dedicated their lives to the revolutionary cause did not expect, of course, that the same symbol of reappropriation would become, over time and because of some male revolutionary comrades, an instrument of oppression. Women responded to the authoritarian and patriarchal turn that the revolutionary regime took after 1981 in different ways. At first, they organized numerous protests, independent of political parties, so that the promises of improvement in their living conditions, made during the Revolution, would be kept. Later, feminist demands were channeled into different political parties, which, however, did not survive the purges of the regime.​​ 

What survived, however, was the Society of Women of the Islamic Revolution, which promoted some concepts of Islamic feminism, and which proposed a model of an independent woman in the professional field, but who was still able to maintain her family role, considered essential. They used a powerful means of information: the magazine "Woman Today", which proposed the Islamic development model as the best possible for women’s affirmation. Many Iranian Islamic feminists dedicated themselves to the creation of institutions through which the interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence was also open to women, in the belief that the patriarchal interpretation of the Scriptures was the result of the will of men and not that of God. This is how many Iranian women then clandestinely became mujtahids, even though it was a role exclusively reserved for men. The publications represent the main support of the Society of Islamic Women, and its greatest legacy. However, unfortunately, feminist publications have often encountered the difficulty of censorship, and the Society has often clashed with the regime. A striking example is represented by the cases of jurists Sihrin Ebadi and Mehrangiz Kar, who served a period of imprisonment for their feminist commitment. It is interesting to note how some members of the clergy, attributable to the progressive faction based in the city of Qom, have often used female pseudonyms in order to publish some reformist and feminist arguments of Islamic precepts (Affami, Friedl, 1994).​​ 

In more recent times, Iranian feminism has developed in an associative sense within the Third Sector, through the phenomenon that Anna Vanzan describes as the birth of the “archipelago of NGOs”. The many Non-Governmental Organizations that deal with women’s rights are often interested in the struggle in intersectional terms, like the large associations that preceded them in the contemporary age. Many Non-Governmental Organizations are located in urban areas, but some also arise in rural areas, dealing mainly with the right to education. Some organizations deal solely with gender oppression, while others also dedicate themselves to transversal issues; some have an exquisitely political character, while others are inserted within the cultural sphere of the country. In addition to this, Non-Governmental Organizations also perform the useful function of bridge between the Iranian reality and abroad, maintaining relations with similar associations present in other countries, especially with the millions of daughters of the diaspora. The latter have played, and continue to play, an absolutely fundamental role for the Iranian feminist movement: they provide information on life in Iran when the censorship restrictions do not allow it for those who are in the country; they keep their companions in Iran updated on various research topics and they disseminate the material they produce abroad (Vanzan, 2005).

In light of what has been said in relation to the causes of the Turkish Republic’s exit from the Istanbul Convention, it is possible to notice how, once again, the female body is instrumentalized for the foreign policy purposes of states within the international dynamics between the West and Southwest Asia: a striking example of this is the way in which the Istanbul Convention has been labeled, by Turkish conservative forces, as a product of Western imperialism, inextricably linking the feminist cause to it. Through this case study, the fundamental role that the crisis of capitalist economies has on gender oppression is also highlighted. Therefore, the need for an approach that is as intersectional as possible in feminist studies and in the related struggle becomes essential again.

In this regard, an approach that this article considers particularly valid is the one that has developed within Iranian feminism. The historical path traced by the latter turns out to be particularly multifaceted: within the same feminist movement in Iran, in fact, one can grasp different souls that, over time, have managed to pursue common objectives despite differences in opinion, between religiosity and secularism, between different social classes and political alignments. It emerges that Iranian feminism has never forgotten the anti-colonial cause with which it began to develop more than a century ago, and which accompanies it in all its manifestations. It is particularly relevant, for this article, to underline the importance of this union, which gave birth, in 1979, to a truly mass and all-encompassing anti-colonial Revolution, despite subsequent developments not having maintained its premises. This article and my academic career ask whether it is possible to develop a feminist theory that is truly valid for every subaltern subject, believing that great lessons can be drawn from this experience.

Conclusions

Through a brief summary of the political events that have affected Türkiye and Iran in the contemporary age, it is possible to highlight the extremely important role that Western imperialism has had in influencing the social and political structure of the two States; in particular, we recall the processes of Westernization carried out, respectively, by Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah Pahlavi, whose argumentative bases are found in even earlier periods. This influence has extended to the different social strata, significantly influencing the internal gender dynamics of the two countries (and not only). These moments of "modernization", describable as forced Westernization and submission to European and American needs, are attributed to one of the main causes for which the current regimes, Turkish and Iranian, are experiencing a moment that can be defined as "anti-feminist". In fact, the article highlights how the process of Westernization has also taken place through the imposition of some policies aimed specifically at the female body, and how the gender quest has sometimes been used as a justification for the oppression of the West on Southwest Asia. This latter turns out to be one of the reasons why the governments of the Southwest Asian states, in turn, instrumentalize the female body in an attempt to claim their own authenticity.

It is with this premise that the correlation that some male elites in government in Iran and Türkiye see between feminism and imperialism is particularly relevant; it is in this regard that it is considered extremely necessary to make feminist studies and the related struggle as intersectional as possible, so that they can express themselves through interpretative categories that are also valid for non-Western contexts. Otherwise, the risk is that of providing the current power structures with further spaces for the exercise of oppression, where one wishes, rather, to create tools for liberation. By “current power structures” I do not only mean the dynamic that binds women in a position of inferiority compared to men, but also the one that sees the majority of the world’s population subordinated to the minority that owns most of the financial capital, as well as the pyramidal structure that constitutes the racial hierarchy, at the top of which are white people, and many other structures (reference is made, for example, to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, to ableism, to speciesism). Recognizing the existence of a profound difficulty in drafting a feminist theory that is universally valid for all subaltern subjects, this article refers to Iranian feminism, and to the different facets it assumes, as a possible starting point from which to initiate possible future studies.​​ 

Furthermore, the absolute importance of the deconstruction of discourse is emphasized, which is considered here one of the preferred tools for the creation of the fundamental otherness that justifies the opposition between “the West and the rest”. This article itself wishes to offer new keys to interpretation and, at the same time, an additional tool to deconstruct the current systems of oppression, in the belief that the​​ pars destruens​​ is already, potentially,​​ pars construens. The article also highlights the fundamental reciprocity that exists between gender oppression and inter-ethnic oppression; it is through the analysis of President Erdoğan's speeches and that of the Western press on Iranian women that the current international system shows the basis on which it emerges: the female body. The opening question of this article, which asks what international game is played on women's bodies, can timidly try for an answer: all of them.

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